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It's Alive!: How Early Common Law Changes
in the Right Against Self-Incrimination Inform
the Right's Continuing Relevance
Sheldon Evans*
Abstract
The intersection of the Self-Incrimination Clause and Miranda warn-
ings has stemmed disagreement among courts on the scope and ap-
plication of the right against self-incrimination. To aid in their dilemma,
court's often embark on a historical inquiry to give insight into proper
interpretations of the Clause. In light of a recent circuit split on one of
the Clause's key terms—namely what constitutes a “criminal case”—
this Article embarks on a historical inquiry that adds clarity to the
topic. By highlighting the several ways the right against self-
incrimination changed in its 200 year common law history before the
Constitutional Convention, this Article argues that the right against
self-incrimination was designed, and even intended, to change in the
next several hundred years after its adoption into the Constitution.
“Our forefathers, when they wrote [the right against self-incrimination]
into the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, had in mind a lot of history
which has been largely forgotten to-day.”1
I. Introduction
“Did you plan to set re to the city of Westminster?” This question
from the defense attorney was designed to invalidate the hostile
witness's testimony against his client. This strategy proved short-lived
when the judge objected to this line of questioning almost immediately.
Normally, a witness could refuse to answer such an inquiry based on
his right against self-incrimination; however, this witness did not enjoy
such a right, since all of his crimes had already been pardoned. When
the defense attorney reminded the court that the witness faced no
possibility of incriminating himself, the court reminded the defense at-
torney “neither his life nor name must suer, and therefore such ques-
tions must not be asked him.” In the absence of the pardon, the ques-
tion opened up the witness to criminal jeopardy; however, even in the
presence of the pardon, the question opened up the witness to public
reproach and calumny. Therefore, the court blocked such questioning,
*Associate Attorney, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP. B.A., University of Southern
California, 2008; J.D., University of Chicago, 2012.
1
Maffie v. U.S., 209 F.2d 225, 237 (1st Cir. 1954).
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nding that the right against self-incrimination also protected wit-
nesses from being compelled to give testimony that would infame or
disgrace him.2
If this courtroom scenario seems foreign, it is because the right
against self-infamation was one of the evolutions of the right against
self-incrimination (hereinafter, the “Right”) in common law England and
the Colonies prior to the Right's codication in the Fifth Amendment of
the Constitution. Remembering these forgotten historical develop-
ments puts us back into the shoes of the Framers at the time of the
Convention. It helps remind us how they understood the Right to tailor
itself accordingly to the times in which it was being applied.
This Article argues that the Right's development in the common law
for 200 years before the drafting of the Constitution reveals the inten-
tion that the Right continue to evolve after its ratication. The Framers
knew how the Right had developed in England and the Colonies and
would not have been so naive as to believe that they could stop the
common law in its tracks. After all, the Right enjoyed consistent and
progressive changes since its recognition in the ecclesiastical royal
courts of the Crown; what would make the Framers think they could
hold it static? Thus, a premium is not put on the size, scope, or eect
of these changes, but rather on the existence of such changes.
While the original intent of the Framers may never be divined, this
Article makes one thing clear: from its adoption into the common law3
to its inclusion in the United States Constitution, the Right's meaning
and application changed.4 Such change should not be surprising either:
throughout its history, those who championed the Right have adapted
2
This scenario closely follows the real events in the 1679 trial of Nathaniel
Reading, which was a part of the string of tragic cases in the Popish Plot in England. It
illustrates one of the rst times a court recognized the right against self-infamation as
an established right in the common law, even though it had been advocated for in
previous generations. See Levy, infra note 9, at 317.
3
The Right was ocially recognized in English common law in 1649 after the
two day trial and public spectacle of John Lilburne, who was accused and eventually
acquitted of high treason. See Levy, infra note 9, at 300–01, 313.
4
Although not the subject of this Article, subtle changes can be traced back to
the Right's roots in the Latin maxim nemo tenetur prodere seipsum in the European
ius commune. See Richard H. Helmholz, The Privilege and the Ius Commune: The
Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century, in The Privilege against Self-Incrimination 17
(Richard H. Helmholz et al. eds., 1997) [hereinafter Helmholz, Privilege]. The term
nemo tenetur prodere seipsum roughly translates to mean that “no man is bound to
accuse himself.” See Levy, infra note 9, at 3. See Helmholz, Introduction, in The
Privilege against Self-Incrimination 17 [hereinafter Helmholz, Introduction] (stating that
the ius commune was the most common justice system in the Middle Ages in Europe;
the ius comune was a combination of Roman law and Canon law that dominated
European legal education before the modern era).
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it to keep up with the changes in the criminal procedure of their times.5
This realization lends a rational basis to believe the Framers expected
that the Right would continue to change 200 years after the
Constitutional Convention as it had done for the previous 200 years.
These historical happenings still prove relevant today, especially in
the wake of Miranda v. Arizona6 and the volumes of case law which it
has spawned. Miranda's importance in our justice system is
considerable. This case requires that law enforcement agents inform
all that enter custodial interrogation that they have the right to remain
silent and the right to speak to an attorney.7 While it has its share of
detractors,8 Miranda has also been described as the mainstay of our
criminal justice system.9 It continues to stand as a symbol that
represents the Court's goal toward expanding rights of the accused10
during an era of injustice in our country's history.11 Like the genera-
tions before the founding, the Court interpreted the Right to keep up
with the ever changing procedures in the criminal justice system of
their time.
Perhaps expectedly, the paradigm shift introduced by Miranda has
caused confusion over the scope and application of the Right in the
past few decades. Courts have lled volumes with discussions of
Miranda’s progeny, which both limit Miranda and explores its
relevance.12
5
More apply stated, “Advocates . . . [took] existing legal precedents into dier-
ent contexts, turning them to new uses. In that sense there has been progression,
even continuity of a kind . . . The rule has meant dierent things at dierent times.”
Helmholz, Introduction, supra note 4, at 12.
6
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d
974 (1966).
7
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
8
See generally, e.g., Stephen J. Markman & Paul Marcus, Miranda Decision
Revisited: Did It Give Criminals Too Many Rights?, 57 UMKC L. Rev. 15, 15–20
(1988); Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 Vand. L. Rev. 1417 (1985); Paul G.
Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 387
(1996); Phillip E. Johnson, A Statutory Replacement for the Miranda Doctrine, 24 Am.
Crim. L. Rev. 303 (1987).
9
See Leonard W. Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment: The Right Against
Self-Incrimination xi, 432 (1st ed. 968).
10
See Michael J. Roth, Note, Berkemer Revisited: Uncovering the Middle Ground
Between Miranda and the New Terry, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 2779, 2786 (2009) (calling
Miranda the peak of the Warren Court's criminal procedure revolution (quoting Lucas
A. Powe, Jr., The Warren Court and American Politics 407 (2000))).
11
The 1960s was a time of both recovery from McCarthyism and the Red Scare,
and also was the height of the Civil Rights era. See infra note 157 and accompanying
text.
12
See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S. Ct. 643, 28 L. Ed. 2d 1
(1971); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1980);
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Chavez v. Martinez13 is an exemplar of the need for clarity on this
subject. Chavez held that the Right can only be broken if un-
Mirandized14 or coerced15 self-incriminating evidence is used in a
“criminal case.”16 However, the Court expressly declined to give a
concrete meaning to the term “criminal case.”17 The Court has yet to
clarify Chavez, which has caused a circuit split in the U.S. courts of
appeals. The Court has clearly said that the Right is not applicable
before criminal charges are led,18 and that the same Right is ap-
plicable at the actual criminal trial.19 What about the period of time
from when criminal charges are led up until the commencement of
trial? Is the self-incrimination clause applicable in this gray area? The
California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 101 S. Ct. 2806, 69 L. Ed. 2d 696 (1981); New
York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 81 L. Ed. 2d 550 (1984); Colorado v.
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S. Ct. 515, 93 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1986); Dickerson v. U.S.,
530 U.S. 428, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 147 L. Ed. 2d 405 (2000); Chavez v. Martinez, 538
U.S. 760, 123 S. Ct. 1994, 155 L. Ed. 2d 984 (2003); Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S.
600, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 159 L. Ed. 2d 643 (2004); Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S.
370, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 176 L. Ed. 2d 1098 (2010). This footnote is not meant to be
exhaustive, but only names a few examples of important developments in Miranda
jurisprudence since the Miranda rule's inception.
13
Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 123 S. Ct. 1994, 155 L. Ed. 2d 984 (2003).
14
For purposes of this Article, the term “un-Mirandized” statements or evidence
will be dened as statements or evidence obtained without a Miranda warning. In
other words, statements or evidence obtained in a situation where Miranda rights
should have been read, but they were not.
15
It is important to note the circuit split caused by Chavez addresses both the
use of un-Mirandized self-incriminating evidence as well as coerced self-incriminating
evidence. Un-Mirandized statements t under the umbrella of “coerced” statements.
Miranda is based on the idea that custodial interrogation is inherently coercive, and so
Miranda warnings help prevent coerced self-incriminating statements. Miranda, 384
U.S. at 719.
Chavez governs for both situations. It covers wrongfully obtained self-
incriminating evidence, including un-Mirandized and coerced statements. See Chavez,
538 U.S. at 766.
For the inadmissibility of coerced evidence under the Fifth Amendment, see the
well cited case Bram v. U.S., 168 U.S. 532, 542, 18 S. Ct. 183, 42 L. Ed. 568 (1897)
(“In criminal trials, in the courts of the United States, wherever a question arises
whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary, the issue is controlled by
[the Self-Incrimination Clause] of the Fifth Amendment.”); see also Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165, 173, 72 S. Ct. 205, 96 L. Ed. 183, 25 A.L.R.2d 1396 (1952) (explaining
why coerced confessions are inadmissible under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause: because of their unreliability, and their oense of the community's
sense of fair play and decency); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 537, 83 S. Ct. 917,
9 L. Ed. 2d 922 (1963); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540–41, 81 S. Ct. 735, 5
L. Ed. 2d 760 (1961).
16
Chavez, 538 U.S. at 772–73.
17
Chavez, 538 U.S. at 767.
18
Chavez, 538 U.S. at 769.
19
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 491–99.
Criminal Law Bulletin
618 © 2015 Thomson Reuters E Criminal Law Bulletin E Vol. 51 No. 3
Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits have answered no, holding that the
term “criminal case” should be interpreted as a criminal trial that com-
mences with opening arguments in front of a judge.20 The Second,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have answered yes, holding that the term
“criminal case” should be interpreted as any criminal proceeding,
commencing after criminal charges have been led against a suspect.21
While the circuit split is still ripe, this Article diers from common
scholarship addressing circuit splits in that resolving the split is not
the focus, but rather illustrates the need for clarity on the subject.22
This Article attempts to nd such clarity by adding to the lively debate
in scholarship between Living Constitutionalism and Originalism.
Whereas Living Constitutionalism interprets the Constitution as a
document that was designed to change over time, Originalism argues
that the Constitution is best understood and applied as the original
Framers, and citizens at the time, would have understood and applied
the document. Over the years, for example, academics have attacked
Miranda’s scope and eect by appealing to originalist ideals of the
Right;23 these interpretations have been wielded to undercut the ap-
plication of the Right and the buer zone that Miranda warnings
provide for its protection.24 While the debate on proper interpretation
rages on, courts similarly disagree on the application of Miranda,
which tie back to diering historical interpretations of the Right.25
20
See Renda v. King, 347 F.3d 550, 559, 62 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1131 (3d Cir.
2003); Burrell v. Virginia, 395 F.3d 508, 513–14 (4th Cir. 2005); Murray v. Earle, 405
F.3d 278, 285, 289–90 (5th Cir. 2005).
21
See Sornberger v. City of Knoxville, Ill., 434 F.3d 1006, 1026–27 (7th Cir.
2006); Higazy v. Templeton, 505 F.3d 161, 170–73 (2d Cir. 2007); Stoot v. City of
Everett, 582 F.3d 910, 925 (9th Cir. 2009).
22
In this respect, this Article is quite dierent from works that have sought
resolution of this particular circuit split through some novel interpretation or underlying
current of common reasoning. See, e.g., Georey B. Fehling, Note, Verdugo, Where'd
You Go?: Stoot v. City of Everett and Evaluating Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination
Civil Liability Violations, 18 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 481 (2011); Thea A. Cohen, Note,
Self-Incrimination and Separation of Powers, 100 Geo. L.J. 895 (2012).
23
See generally Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First
Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 857, 900 (1995).
24
Miranda warnings are described as a prophylactic measure meant to safeguard
the Right. Therefore, a violation in Miranda is not a violation of the Right itself, but is
meant to be a buer zone so as to prevent anyone from coming close to breaking the
Right. See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 690–91, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 123 L. Ed. 2d
407 (1993) (citing Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203, 109 S. Ct. 2875, 106 L.
Ed. 2d 166 (1989); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528, 107 S. Ct. 828, 93 L.
Ed. 2d 920 (1987); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 84 L. Ed.
2d 222 (1985); Quarles, 467 U.S. at 654; Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444, 94
S. Ct. 2357, 41 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1974)).
25
“The history of the Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination,
and the evils against which it was directed, have received considerable attention in
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Therefore, this Article seeks to resolve the split in academia more so
than resolve the split in the U.S. courts of appeals.
In so doing, this Article proceeds in ve parts. Following this section,
Section II provides a brief backdrop of the history of Miranda, the path
to Chavez, and ultimately the culmination of uncertainty on the Right's
application in a “criminal case” as illustrated in the circuit split. With
this illustration in mind, Section III considers a brief background on the
debate between Living Constitutionalism and Originalism as the
methodological frame. This leads into Section IV, which discusses the
common law history and changes of the Right from its recognition as a
common law right in England through its adoption in the Constitution.
These changes are the key, and show that the Right's understanding
and application has changed with time. Section V concludes the Article,
and oers both a look at the historical lessons learned from the vari-
ous changes of the Right as well as short thoughts on interpreting the
Right in light of the circuit split.
II. MIRANDA and Beyond: U.S. Courts and the Self-Incrimination
Clause
The Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause states that “[n]o
person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself.”26 This clause was interpreted perhaps most
inuentially in Miranda. This inuence justies analysis of the cases
that led to Miranda, Miranda itself, and Miranda's progeny as a central
component in tracking the Supreme Court's past and present percep-
tions of the Right.27
Until Miranda, the voluntariness test was commonly employed in
the opinions of this Court.” Tucker, 417 U.S. at 439 (citing Kastigar v. U.S., 406 U.S.
441, 92 S. Ct. 1653, 32 L. Ed. 2d 212 (1972); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86
S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966); Murphy v. Waterfront Com'n
of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 84 S. Ct. 1594, 12 L. Ed. 2d 678, 56 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2544, 49 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 51102 (1964) (abrogated on other grounds by,
U.S. v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 118 S. Ct. 2218, 141 L. Ed. 2d 575, 49 Fed. R. Evid.
Serv. 371 (1998)); Ullmann v. U.S., 350 U.S. 422, 426, 76 S. Ct. 497, 100 L. Ed. 511,
53 A.L.R.2d 1008 (1956); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 12 S. Ct. 195, 35
L. Ed. 1110, 3 A.F.T.R. (P-H) P 2529 (1892) (overruled on other grounds in part by,
Kastigar v. U.S., 406 U.S. 441, 92 S. Ct. 1653, 32 L. Ed. 2d 212 (1972))). Murphy, for
example, considered the Right's development in English common law and in the U.S.
courts, and used these lessons from history to inform its ruling. See Murphy, 378 U.S.
at 58–77. Miranda similarly recalled the history of the Star Chamber and the roots of
the Right in common law in order to justify developing the prophylactic that the deci-
sion is famous for. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458–60.
26
U.S. Const. amend. V.
27
Even though this Article focuses on the correct interpretation of the Right,
Miranda and its progeny are chiey relevant because it has shaped American
jurisprudence on how to interpret the Right. See, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412,
427, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1986) (describing Miranda as “[the Court's]
interpretation of the Federal Constitution”); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and
Remedial Equilibration, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 857, 909 (1999) (explaining that at the time
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criminal procedure.28 This legal rule viewed any confession as admis-
sible so long as it was voluntary. Unfortunately, voluntariness was an
unsound standard that was dicult to ascertain.29 Not surprisingly, the
voluntariness standard subjected many criminal suspects to torturous
ordeals at the hands of the state in order to elicit a “voluntary”
confession.30 Cases like Brown v. Mississippi,31 Brooks v. Florida,32 and
Lynum v. Illinois33 represent the limitations of the voluntariness test,
which placed too much faith in the veracity of confessions while failing
to provide defendants with meaningful protection. In light of a steady
stream of legal challenges in the 1950s and 1960s, the Court realized
that reforms were needed and embarked on fashioning responsive
safeguards.34
of decision, Miranda was understood to be “an interpretation of the Fifth Amendment,
which forbids compelling a person ‘to be a witness against himself’ in ‘any criminal
case’ ’’); Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296, 110 S. Ct. 2394, 110 L. Ed. 2d 243
(1990) (describing Miranda rules as resting on “the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination”); Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629, 106 S. Ct. 1404, 89 L.
Ed. 2d 631 (1986) (overruled on other grounds by, Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S.
778, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 173 L. Ed. 2d 955 (2009)) (“The Fifth Amendment protection
against compelled self-incrimination provides the right to counsel at custodial
interrogations.”); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 481–82, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 68 L.
Ed. 2d 378 (1981) (describing Miranda as having “determined that the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments” required custodial interrogation to be preceded by advice
concerning the suspect's rights).
Pre-Miranda decisions regarding the Right, some of which are explored in this
Article, are only important if they provide a lead up to Miranda given the scope of this
Article.
28
See Paul Marcus, Defending Miranda, 24 Land & Water L. Rev. 241, 242
(1989); Roscoe C. Howard, Jr. & Lisa A. Rich, A History of Miranda and Why It
Remains Vital Today, 40 Val. U. L. Rev. 685, 686–87 (2006).
29
To a certain extent, the voluntariness standard still exists, since a voluntary
waiver of Miranda rights can lead to a confession.
30
See Marcus, supra note 28, at 242–43.
31
Brown v. State of Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 56 S. Ct. 461, 80 L. Ed. 682
(1936). In Brown, the suspect was hanged from a tree and continually whipped until
he confessed. Brown, 297 U.S. at 281–82.
32
Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413, 88 S. Ct. 541, 19 L. Ed. 2d 643 (1967). In
Brooks, a suspect was conned in a small cell and given a restricted diet for thirty-
ve days until he confessed. Brooks, 389 U.S. at 413–14.
33
Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 83 S. Ct. 917, 9 L. Ed. 2d 922 (1963). In
Lynum, psychological coercion was involved to elicit a confession involving the use of
threats regarding the suspect's children being taken away unless a confession was
given. Lynum, 372 U.S. at 533–34.
The fact that many of these confession cases with horrendous fact patters
involve racial minorities, including the upcoming Miranda decision, should be no
surprise as the Court continued to move in this era for protections for minorities.
34
See Marcus, supra note 28, at 242.
Early Common Law
621© 2015 Thomson Reuters E Criminal Law Bulletin E Vol. 51 No. 3
Mallory v. Hogan35 and Murphy v. Waterfront Commission36 were
steps towards applying safeguards where they were needed the most:
state law enforcement agencies.37 Since the Constitution only applied
to the federal government, Mallory made the Right applicable to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment;38 Murphy was an appropri-
ate complement to Mallory,39 holding that the Right may be enjoyed in
state court where an answer may incriminate the witness in federal
court, and vice versa.40
It was Escobedo v. Illinois,41 however, that made the most signicant
pre-Miranda break from the voluntariness test. In Escobedo, a murder
suspect was being interrogated by the police when his request to
speak with a lawyer was refused. The Supreme Court overturned the
defendant's subsequent conviction, stating that the state's denial of
counsel was in violation of the Sixth Amendment, which guarantees
the accused the right to the assistance of counsel in all criminal
prosecutions.42 The Court importantly acknowledged that the period
between arrest and indictment is critical because most false confes-
sions are elicited during this time.43 Consequently, the Court held that
if the accused is denied a lawyer during this period, any statements
made by the accused would be inadmissible in a criminal trial.44
A. Miranda and its Progeny
The Court's logic in Escobedo set the stage for Miranda v. Arizona.45
When Miranda was decided, the Warren Court seemed to be on a
35
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S. Ct. 1489, 12 L. Ed. 2d 653 (1964).
36
Murphy v. Waterfront Com'n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 84 S. Ct. 1594,
12 L. Ed. 2d 678, 56 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2544, 49 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 51102 (1964)
(abrogated on other grounds by, U.S. v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 118 S. Ct. 2218, 141 L.
Ed. 2d 575, 49 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 371 (1998)).
37
See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text. All of these egregious fact
patterns, came out of the states' sovereign exercising its police powers. This is to be
expected, as most law enforcement duties are given to the states.
38
Mallory, 378 U.S. at 7.
39
The decisions for both Murphy and Mallory were handed down on the same
day, which lends credence to the thought that the Court fashioned each with the other
in mind.
40
Murphy, 378 U.S. at 77–79.
41
Escobedo v. State of Ill., 378 U.S. 478, 84 S. Ct. 1758, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977
(1964).
42
U.S. Const. amend. VI.
43
Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 488.
44
Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 488, 490–91.
45
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436.
See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 465–66, which captures the Court's reliance on
Escobedo to support its reasoning in the Miranda decision.
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campaign to expand the rights of the criminally accused,46 which
prompted it to progressively apply the Self-Incrimination Clause to
situations outside of trial.47 In Miranda, police took suspect Ernesto
Miranda into custody and interrogated him.48 Miranda was not advised
of his right to remain silent or of his right to consult with an attorney.49
Later, his confession to police ocers was introduced by the prosecu-
tor to incriminate him at trial.50 The Court, noting these procedural
defects, overturned Miranda's conviction and held that when a suspect
is subject to custodial interrogations,
[h]e must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to
remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of
law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he
cannot aord an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires.51
Miranda warnings have been issued countless times over the decades
by law enforcement ocers when taking people into custody.
Meanwhile, the warning has become one of the most popular phrases
in American history.
Even more important than the ushering of the new Miranda warn-
ings rule was the Court's ndings earlier in its opinion that “[t]oday,
then, there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege [against
self-incrimination] is available outside of criminal court proceedings
and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of
action is curtailed in any signicant way from being compelled to
46
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
47
See Roth, supra note 10, at 2786 (string citing numerous cases to illustrate the
expansion of rights of the criminally accused, including the following: Katz v. U.S., 389
U.S. 347, 357–59, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967) (declaring that wiretapping
of telephone booths by investigators without a warrant violated the Fourth Amend-
ment); Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 490–91 (ruling that the Sixth Amendment provides a
criminal defendant the right to counsel during a police interrogation); Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963) (nding a due process
violation where the prosecution withheld certain evidence from the defendant during
trial); Douglas v. People of State of Cal., 372 U.S. 353, 355, 83 S. Ct. 814, 9 L. Ed. 2d
811 (1963) (guaranteeing indigent defendants the right to counsel during their rst ap-
peal of a criminal trial); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L.
Ed. 2d 799, 93 A.L.R.2d 733 (1963) (requiring states to provide counsel to defendants
who could not aord one in criminal trials according to the Sixth Amendment); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 653–55, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 86 Ohio L. Abs. 513,
84 A.L.R.2d 933 (1961) (incorporating the exclusionary rule to state criminal procedure
law through the Fourteenth Amendment)).
48
Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 491.
49
Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 491.
50
Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 492.
51
Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 479.
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incriminate themselves.”52 The Court candidly recognized that it was
expanding the scope of the Fifth Amendment. The Court continued
such expansion in Lefkowitz v. Turley53 by expanding the Right to civil
trials.54
Such expansions of Miranda and the Right caused uneasiness,
prompting the Court to scale back the protections.55 For one, since
“custodial interrogation” was necessary to trigger the protections
under Miranda, the Court sought to construe the term as narrowly as
possible. In California v. Beheler,56 the Court emphasized the meaning
of “custodial” by noting that, “in Miranda . . . ‘[by] custodial interroga-
tion, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement ocers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any signicant way.’ ’’57 In contrast, the Court
52
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
53
Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 94 S. Ct. 316, 38 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1973); see
also McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 35, 45 S. Ct. 16, 69 L. Ed. 158 (1924).
54
Witnesses can exercise their right to remain silent (or in other words, not be
compelled to give an answer) during ocial questioning in a civil or criminal trial. This
right would prevent otherwise compelled answers from causing a witness to be
criminally prosecuted at some future time in light of his or her testimony. See Lefkowitz,
414 U.S. at 77; McCarthy, 266 U.S. at 40. Chavez is harmonious with Lefkowitz
because even if a witness is compelled to answer at such a proceeding, the witness's
privilege against self-incrimination is not broken unless it is used at the witness's
potential future criminal prosecution. See Lefkowitz, 414 U.S. at 78. Yet, the holding
still illustrates the broader point that the Court was expanding the scope of the ap-
plication of Fifth Amendment protections. Similar to Miranda, Lefkowitz could be
characterized as a prophylactic right; therefore, a witness exercising their privilege
against self-incrimination by not answering a question is preventing even the possibil-
ity of the Right being violated because there will be no self-incriminating statement to
introduce at their potential future criminal prosecution.
55
See Caplan, supra note 8, at 1418 (illustrating the Supreme Court's unwilling-
ness to expand Miranda, and the Court's dilution of Miranda’s principles (citing Harris
v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S. Ct. 643, 28 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1971); Georey R. Stone,
The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 Sup. Ct. Rev. 99, 118 (1977)).
Miranda’s progeny were probably reactionary measures to prevent the danger-
ous expansion of the paradigm, or to protect the Court's legitimacy. The persuasion of
this point is magnied when considering Miranda's critics in law enforcement and
academia that thought the Court overstepped its bounds and usurped the role of the
legislature in determining specic rules to protect Constitutional rights. See Roth,
supra note 10, at 2789–90; see also Richard A. Leo, Miranda, Confessions, and
Justice: Lessons for Japan?, in the Japanese Adversary System in Context:
Controversies and Comparisons 200, 202 (Malcolm M. Feeley & Setsuo Miyazawa
eds., 2002) (describing how law enforcement initially saw Miranda as ironically
handcung them, preventing them from eectively investigating crimes and ultimately
incarcerating criminals).
56
California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 103 S. Ct. 3517, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1275
(1983).
57
Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1123 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444).
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limited the “interrogation” aspect of Miranda in Rhode Island v. Innis58
by holding “the term ‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers . . . to
express questioning . . . [and] also to any words or actions on the
part of the police . . . that the police should know are reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.”59 Thus, as
long as the police did not limit the physical freedom of a suspect or
question them directly or indirectly, any self-incriminating statements
could be used at trial without needing a Miranda warning. Additionally,
California v. Prysock60 gave law enforcement agents more exibility in
the practical application of Miranda warnings by not requiring that they
be said verbatim.61 New York v. Quarles62 loosened the standard even
further by establishing an exception to giving a Miranda warning when
there was a public safety threat, as determined by the discretion of
the individual law enforcement agent present at the scene.63
Such limits started to deteriorate the once expansive interpretation
of the Self-Incrimination Clause that Miranda had articulated; the Court
whittled away Miranda’s standards so much so that Miranda’s
relevance was questioned in criminal justice.64
However, the Court refused to completely disband Miranda in Dick-
erson v. United States.65 Dickerson was led in response to a U.S.
congressional statute that sought to do away with Miranda completely
by reviving the voluntariness test.66 The case arose out of an incident
where a suspect made a voluntary, but un-Mirandized, self-
58
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1980).
59
Innis, 446 U.S. at 300–01.
60
California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 101 S. Ct. 2806, 69 L. Ed. 2d 696 (1981).
61
Prysock, 453 U.S. at 359–61.
62
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 81 L. Ed. 2d 550 (1984).
63
Quarles, 467 U.S. at 655–56.
64
See Alfredo Garcia, Is Miranda Dead, Was It Overruled, Or Is It Irrelevant?, 10
St. Thomas L. Rev. 461, 462–63 (1998) (arguing that the Miranda rule was a failure of
the Warren Court and that it had eectively been done away with by cases like Innis
and Quarles); see also Roth, supra note 10, at 2795 (noting that the development of
the more conservative Burger Court had added to speculation that Miranda was losing
importance).
65
Dickerson v. U.S., 530 U.S. 428, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 147 L. Ed. 2d 405 (2000).
66
18 U.S.C.A. § 3501(a) states:
In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the District of Columbia, a
confession . . . shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given. Before such confes-
sion is received in evidence, the trial judge shall, out of the presence of the jury, determine
any issue as to voluntariness. If the trial judge determines that the confession was voluntarily
made it shall be admitted in evidence and the trial judge shall permit the jury to hear relevant
evidence on the issue of voluntariness and shall instruct the jury to give such weight to the
confession as the jury feels it deserves under all the circumstances.
The purpose of this statute was to overrule Miranda. See Dickerson, 530 U.S.
at 436.
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incriminating statement during interrogation at an FBI oce.67 The
Court denied the admissibility of this self-incriminating evidence and
stated that Miranda—as a constitutional interpretation of due process
rights—cannot be superseded by a contrary congressional statute.68
B. Chavez v. Martinez
While confusion was still lingering over Miranda’s continuing
relevance, the Court decided Chavez v. Martinez.69 The case involved
the custodial interrogation of suspect Oliviero Martinez while he was
at the hospital being treated for a gunshot wound.70 Due to the stress
caused by his injury, persistent questioning by the police, and a
reasonable belief that death was imminent, Martinez gave an un-
Mirandized, self-incriminating confession.71 Martinez, however, survived
the ordeal and later brought a section 1983 claim72 against the police,
even though he was never charged with a crime.73
The Court held that there had been no violation of Martinez's rights,74
thereby clarifying an important point about Miranda and the Right. The
Court reiterated that Miranda is a mere prophylactic rule that helps
prevent any infringement of the Right.75 Having Miranda rights read to
a suspect is not a constitutional right in and of itself, but rather is
employed as a buer zone to prevent constitutional rights from being
67
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432.
68
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432.
69
Chavez, 538 U.S. at 760.
70
Chavez, 538 U.S. at 764.
71
Chavez, 538 U.S. at 764.
72
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 reads:
Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, Suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial ocer for an act or omission
taken in such ocer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of
this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
Section 1983 is a part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and allows people to sue
state actors who violate their constitutional rights. Starting with Chavez and continuing
through the circuit split, all of the cases discussed in this Article involved causes of
action for relief under section 1983, claiming that State actors (law enforcement)
broke their Fifth Amendment Right against self-incrimination.
73
Chavez, 538 U.S. at 764–65.
74
Chavez, 538 U.S. at 766, 776.
75
Chavez, 538 U.S. at 770, 772.
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broken.76 As a result, “the absence of a ‘criminal case’ in which
Martinez was compelled to be a ‘witness’ against himself defeats his
core Fifth Amendment claim.”77
Unfortunately, the question of what does constitute a Fifth Amend-
ment claim was not addressed in Chavez. Although the Court
articulated what does not constitute a “criminal case,” it never
articulated what does. Instead, the Court found that they “need not
decide today the precise moment when a ‘criminal case’ commences,”
but that “a ‘criminal case’ at the very least requires the initiation of
legal proceedings.”78 The Court did provide clues as to its intent by
citing Blyew v. United States79 and Black's Law Dictionary80 to give a
broad understanding of the denition of the term “case,”81 but explicitly
refused to decide the bounds of a “criminal case” for purposes of
proper application of the Self-Incrimination Clause.
C. Circuit Split
This uncertainty caused by the undened term of “criminal case”
caused a circuit split, as lower courts have been left to answer
follow-up questions: What constitutes a “criminal case” when using
un-Mirandized self-incriminating evidence? Is such evidence excluded
from only criminal trials (hereinafter referred to as the “Criminal Trial
Theory”), or is it also excluded from any criminal proceeding after
criminal charges have been led (hereinafter referred to as the
“Criminal Proceeding Theory”)? All the courts agree that such evidence
cannot be used at trial, but disagree on the legal rule applied in the
gray area between the ling of criminal charges and the commence-
ment of a criminal trial.
1. The Criminal Trial Theory: The Third, Fourth, and Fifth
Circuits
The Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits have all held that the Right only
applies to self-incriminating un-Mirandized statements used against a
defendant at a criminal trial.
76
See Chavez, 538 U.S. at 770–71. A poor analogy is that jumping in the mote
and swimming is not a violation in and of itself. Rather, it is only when you penetrate
the castle that there is reason to go to war.
77
Chavez, 538 U.S. at 772–73.
78
Chavez, 538 U.S. at 767, 762. The Court says something very similar in U.S. v.
Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 637, 124 S. Ct. 2620, 159 L. Ed. 2d 667 (2004) (“We need not
decide here the precise boundaries of the [Self-Incrimination] Clause's protection. For
present purposes, it suces to note that the core protection aorded by the Self-
Incrimination Clause is a prohibition on compelling a criminal defendant to testify
against himself at trial.”).
79
Blyew v. U.S., 80 U.S. 581, 595, 20 L. Ed. 638, 1871 WL 14736 (1871).
80
Black's Law Dictionary 215 (6th 1990).
81
Chavez, 538 U.S. at 766.
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Only a few months after Chavez, the Third Circuit decided Renda v.
King.82 In this case, Valerie Renda led criminal charges against her
boyfriend for domestic abuse.83 Later, Renda claimed to have been
slammed against a wall in a follow-up call with the police.84 The next
day, the police interviewed Renda in person, but Renda did not reiter-
ate the wall slamming incident in her written report because she admit-
ted it was fabricated.85 Even though the police conducted their inter-
rogation of Renda without reading giving her a Miranda warning,86 they
still charged her with ling a false police report and took her into
custody.87 Further, they used her un-Mirandized self-incriminating
statements to develop probable cause sucient to charge her.88 Later,
the criminal case was dropped because the Renda's confession was
excluded due to the lack of a Miranda warning.89 When Renda later
led a section 1983 claim, the Third Circuit dismissed it, saying
[U]nlike in Chavez, Renda's statement was used in a criminal case in one
sense (i.e., to develop probable cause sucient to charge her). To the
extent that Chavez leaves open the issue of when a statement is used at
a criminal proceeding . . . our prior decision in Giuffre compels the
conclusion that it is the use of coerced statements during a criminal trial,
and not in obtaining an indictment, that violates the Constitution.90
The Third Circuit acknowledged that this case diered signicantly
from Chavez. Accordingly, it instead relied upon its prior ruling in Giuf-
fre v. Bissell91 to decide the case. Guiffre held that un-Mirandized self-
incriminating evidence had to be used at a criminal trial in order to
infringe on the privilege against self-incrimination.92 Thus, while not
expressly relying on Chavez, the Third Circuit became the rst federal
court of appeals to interpret the term “criminal case” to mean a
criminal trial in light of the ambiguity left by Chavez.
The Fourth Circuit examined a similar issue a few years later in Bur-
rell v. Virginia.93 At the scene of a trac accident, police asked one of
82
Renda v. King, 347 F.3d 550, 62 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1131 (3d Cir. 2003).
83
Renda, 347 F.3d at 552.
84
Renda, 347 F.3d at 552.
85
Renda, 347 F.3d at 552.
86
Renda, 347 F.3d at 552.
87
Renda, 347 F.3d at 552.
88
Renda, 347 F.3d at 553, 559.
89
Renda, 347 F.3d at 553.
90
Renda, 347 F.3d at 559.
91
Giuffre v. Bissell, 31 F.3d 1241 (3d Cir. 1994).
92
Giuffre, 31 F.3d at 1256.
93
Burrell v. Virginia, 395 F.3d 508 (4th Cir. 2005).
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the drivers involved, Burrell, to provide proof of insurance.94 Instead,
Burrell asserted his right against self-incrimination because he would
have incriminated himself for the crime of not maintaining car
insurance.95 After this request and refusal occurred several times,
police charged Burrell with obstruction of justice and failure to maintain
insurance.96 A Virginia trac court convicted Burrell of obstruction of
justice, but his conviction was later reversed on appeal.97 While this
case diers markedly from Chavez, the Fourth Circuit still held that the
Right can only be violated at a trial because
[t]he Chavez plurality . . . refused to allow a section 1983 suit to
proceed, on the ground that no constitutional violation had occurred,
since the compelled testimony was never admitted in court . . . On the
reasoning of . . . the Chavez plurality . . . Burrell's Fifth Amendment
section 1983 claim fails [because] [h]e does not allege any trial action
that violated his Fifth Amendment rights.98
A plain reading of this language shows the Fourth Circuit interpreting
Chavez and the Self-Incrimination Clause to require an actual trial to
trigger the possibility of a constitutional violation.
Only months after this decision, the Fifth Circuit provided the same
interpretation of the term “criminal case” in Murray v. Earle.99 LeCresha
Murray, an eleven year old girl, was a suspect in the death of a two
year old victim.100 Initially, Murray gave an un-Mirandized confession
after police subjected her to a two hour custodial interrogation.101 The
trial court admitted this confession into evidence, which was a
substantial factor in Murray's conviction.102 Three years later, an ap-
peals court reversed the conviction.103 The Fifth Circuit relied on
Chavez in deciding that Murray's rights were infringed because “[t]he
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is a fundamental
trial right which can be violated only at trial, even though pretrial
conduct by law enforcement ocials may ultimately impair that right.”104
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit determined that Murray's Right was only
infringed because the self-incriminating evidence was used at an
94
Burrell, 395 F.3d at 510.
95
Burrell, 395 F.3d at 510.
96
Burrell, 395 F.3d at 510.
97
Burrell, 395 F.3d at 511.
98
Burrell, 395 F.3d at 513–14.
99
Murray v. Earle, 405 F.3d 278 (5th Cir. 2005).
100
Murray, 405 F.3d at 283.
101
Murray, 405 F.3d at 284.
102
Murray, 405 F.3d at 284.
103
Murray, 405 F.3d at 284.
104
Murray, 405 F.3d at 285 (emphasis in original).
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actual trial.105 Additionally, the Fifth Circuit used Chavez to assert that
the use of the term “criminal case” in the Self-Incrimination Clause
should be construed as denoting a trial right.106 Again, this is exactly
what Chavez refused to determine, yet it was used in dicta by the
circuit courts to determine the admission of un-Mirandized confessions.
2. Criminal Proceeding Theory: The Seventh Circuit, Second
Circuit, and Ninth Circuit
In contrast, the Seventh, Second, and Ninth Circuits have held that
the Right applies whenever an un-Mirandized statement is used
against a defendant at any and all criminal pretrial proceedings.
The Seventh Circuit rst considered this issue in Sornberger v. City
of Knoxville.107 The case is born out of the police's believe that the
Sornbergers, a husband and wife couple, committed a bank robbery.108
During Teresa Sornberger's interrogation, she made an un-Mirandized
false confession that was later used against the couple in a preliminary
hearing to determine if there was probable cause to charge them with
the crime, a bail hearing determining the amount of bail, and a
subsequent arraignment where Teresa entered her plea.109 While the
Sornbergers awaited their trial date for four months in prison, another
man was caught in connection with a string of bank robberies, and
confessed to the crime for which the Sornbergers were charged. This
exculpatory evidence led to the Sornbergers' release, and they soon
after led a section 1983 claim.110
In response, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged the dierences
between the Sornbergers' case and Chavez, noticing that “[Teresa's]
‘criminal case’ advanced signicantly farther than did that of the
Chavez plainti, who never had criminal charges led against him at
all.”111 Instead, “Teresa's statement . . . allowed police to develop
probable cause sucient to charge her and initiate a criminal
prosecution.”112 Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit decided that using this
un-Mirandized confession in pretrial criminal proceedings did violate
the Sornberger's Right, which in turn supported their section 1983
claim.113 In explaining its reasoning, the Seventh Circuit stated,
[U]nder Chavez, a criminal prosecution must at least be initiated to
105
Murray, 405 F.3d at 289.
106
Murray, 405 F.3d at 285 n.12.
107
Sornberger v. City of Knoxville, Ill., 434 F.3d 1006 (7th Cir. 2006).
108
Sornberger, 434 F.3d at 1015.
109
Sornberger, 434 F.3d at 1010–12, 1026.
110
Sornberger, 434 F.3d at 1009, 1012.
111
Sornberger, 434 F.3d at 1025.
112
Sornberger, 434 F.3d at 1025.
113
Sornberger, 434 F.3d at 1027.
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implicate a suspect's privilege against self-incrimination. We are also
conscious of language in Chavez suggesting that the Fifth Amendment
is, at bottom, a trial protection. Yet, where, as here, a suspect's criminal
prosecution was not only initiated, but was commenced because of her
allegedly un-warned confession, the “criminal case” contemplated by the
Self-Incrimination Clause has begun. That Teresa's confession was then
introduced as evidence of her guilt at a probable cause hearing, a bail
hearing and an arraignment proceeding further persuades us that Teresa
was “compelled in [a] criminal case to be a witness against herself.”114
Following the Seventh Circuit's line of reasoning, the Second Circuit
decided Higazy v. Templeton.115 This case stemmed from the FBI's ar-
rest of Abdallah Higazy after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Higazy's ar-
rest arose from an anonymous tip that claimed that Higazy had a radio
transmitter that could support ground-to-air communications in his
hotel room, located blocks away from Ground Zero.116
The Second Circuit later determined that the FBI agents coerced117
self-incriminating statements out of Higazy, which were later used at a
bail hearing to justify holding Higazy without bail.118 However, it was
later discovered that the radio transmitter was not owned by Higazy
and he was released.119 In its ruling, the Second Circuit pointed out
that the type of bail hearing endured by Higazy was governed by the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. As these Rules govern all forms
of criminal proceedings, these bail hearings should count as a critical
stage of a “criminal case” with regards to the Right and Chavez.120
Therefore, the Second Circuit found that the use of un-Mirandized
self-incriminating statements in pretrial proceedings violates a
suspect's civil rights and can support a section 1983 claim.121
Most recently, the Ninth Circuit applied the same rule when it
decided Stoot v. City of Everett.122 Stoot involved a four year old victim
114
Sornberger, 434 F.3d at 1026–27 (emphasis in original) (quoting U.S. Const.
amend V).
115
Higazy v. Templeton, 505 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2007).
116
Higazy, 505 F.3d at 164–65.
117
The primary issue in Higazy speaks to coerced self-incriminating evidence and
does not concern un-Mirandized self-incriminating evidence. Even with this dierence,
it is still relevant to interpreting Chavez since that case is applicable to both coerced
and un-Mirandized self-incriminating evidence. See Chavez, 538 U.S. at 766; see also
supra note 15 and accompanying text.
118
Higazy, 505 F.3d at 167.
119
Higazy, 505 F.3d at 167.
120
Higazy, 505 F.3d at 172. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 1(a)(1), 46(a).
121
Higazy, 505 F.3d at 170, 173.
122
Stoot v. City of Everett, 582 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2009).
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that said she was molested by fourteen year old Paul Stoot, Jr.123
When the police interviewed Stoot, he was read his Miranda rights.
Later, the courts found that Stoot did not understand these rights,124
making the warning null and void.125 As a likely result, Stoot later
confessed under coercive pressure.126 Before charges were eventually
dropped, police used what amounted to his un-Mirandized confes-
sion127 in an adavit led in support of the child molestation charge, a
pretrial arraignment and bail hearing, and a pretrial evidentiary
hearing.128
The Ninth Circuit, which had the advantage of seeing the develop-
ment of the circuit split in light of Chavez, decided to apply the reason-
ing of the Seventh and Second circuits.129 In explaining its decision,
the Ninth Circuit stated that
[a] coerced statement has been “used” in a criminal case when it has
been relied upon to le formal charges against the declarant, to determine
judicially that the prosecution may proceed, and to determine pretrial
custody status. Such uses impose precisely the burden precluded by the
Fifth Amendment: namely, they make the declarant a witness against
himself in a criminal proceeding.130
Thus, the Ninth Circuit determined that using wrongfully obtained self-
incriminating evidence in pretrial proceedings is similar enough to be-
ing compelled to be a witness against one's self, and should not be al-
lowed in the United States criminal justice system.131
III. Theories of Interpretation: A Changing or Static Constitu-
tion
The circuit split illustrates the need for clarity on the unresolved is-
sues regarding the Right and its intersection with its Miranda buer
zone. With such uncertainty ever present, it is no surprise that the
123
Stoot, 582 F.3d at 914.
124
Stoot, 582 F.3d at 916.
125
Understanding one's Miranda rights is essential to “voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently” waiving those rights. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. Normally, if Miranda rights
are read to a person, that person can waive their rights to remain silent and have an
attorney present by not remaining silent, and not requesting an attorney. However, if
they do not understand these rights and begin speaking, they have not done so
“knowingly and intelligently” and any statements cannot be used in a “criminal case.”
See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2259–61, 176 L. Ed. 2d
1098 (2010).
126
Stoot, 582 F.3d at 915.
127
See supra note 15 for analysis coerced self-incriminating evidence is similarly
inadmissible in a criminal case.
128
Stoot, 582 F.3d at 923–24.
129
Stoot, 582 F.3d at 924–25.
130
Stoot, 582 F.3d at 925.
131
Stoot, 582 F.3d at 925.
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courts use history to inform their decisions.132 However, dierent
camps among judges and academics disagree on what these lessons
from history should teach us. Should we appeal to history in order to
apply what the Right meant 200 years ago when it was adopted in the
Constitution? Conversely, should we appeal to history in order to get a
picture of the development of the Right to stay true to its continued
evolution? These questions form the basic debate between competing
hermeneutical principles applied to the Constitution: Originalism and
Living Constitutionalism. Ironically, the debate over whether the
Constitution is alive can be said to be alive itself, with some of the
most qualied jurists and legal minds contributing to the discourse.133
Originalism comes in many forms,134 but are all bound by the com-
mon thread that the original meaning of the law as adopted in the past
is a dispositive tool of interpretation of how to apply the law in the
present.135 When applied to the Constitution, it is a theory that places
its faith in the Framers' original intent and posits that this original
intent should govern the application of the law, even today.136 Thus,
132
See, e.g., infra notes 159 and 169 and their accompanying text.
133
Accordingly, I do not seek to provide a denitive treatise on these topics since
there are resources far more expansive than this Article that discuss these issues in
more detail. I only seek to lay a brief but informative backdrop of the debate in how it
relates to the Right.
134
Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 Duke L.J. 239, 244,
247–62 (2009) (arguing that originalism is not one coherent theory, but is a camp of
which several dierent originalist theories exist, all bound together by seeking after
their particular version of originalist intent); see also Jack M. Balkin, 103 NW. U. L.
Rev. 549, 550–51 (2009). Relatedly, and quite ironically, originalist theory has changed
over time, subscribing to diering theories of interpretation. These include the original
intent of the framers, the original meaning to those reading the law at the time period
of its enactment, the original meaning of those who ratied the law, the original
understanding of commoners subject to the law, the original objective meanings and
common understandings, and so forth. See David A. Strauss, The Living Constitution
11, 25–28 (2010).
135
See generally Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduc-
tion of the Law 145 (1990). Bork makes arguments that the Constitution should be
interpreted in accordance with “original understanding,” and should only have the
force it was meant to have by those who enacted and ratied it. Bork, supra note
135, at 143–46. Bork further states that the political content of important decisions
that face judges today are not to be made by the judge, but rather should be decided
by “those who designed and enacted the Constitution.” Bork, supra note 135, at 176–
77; see also Remarks by Justice Antonin Scalia at The Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C, March 14, 2005; A Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation: Remarks by Justice Antonin Scalia at The Catholic University of America
Washington, D.C. Oct. 18, 1996; Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and
Constitutional Adjudication, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 723, 724–27 (1988).
136
See Bork, supra note 135, at 143.
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the key question for the originalist137 is “what did the Framers originally
intend the Right to mean?” As applied to the Right, Originalism has
recently been employed to argue that the Right would only be infringed
in the context of a criminal trial,138 and would likely resolve the
highlighted circuit split in favor of the Third, Fourth, and Fifth's Circuit's
Criminal Trial Theory.
Originalism has an intuitive appeal. After all, whom better to
understand what the law means than those who drafted it. Neverthe-
less, this interpretive theory is not without its aws.139 For example,
how can the intent of the Framers be determined with any sense of
accuracy? The Framers lived and died 200 years ago, and in some
cases, did not leave any debate or legislative history for modern legal
historians to piece together their intent.140 Next, one of the Framers
himself, Thomas Jeerson, advocated for the meaning of laws to
change as the times change.141 In a letter to James Madison, Jeerson
stated that “[t]he Earth belongs . . . to the living . . . We seem not to
have perceived that, by the law of nature, one generation is to another
as one independent nation is to another.”142 Jeerson's view remains
true over 200 years later, as the present-day United States has more
in common with present day New Zealand than it has with the United
States of the 18th century.143 Why then should Americans of today be
subject to the rule144 of men who lived 200 years ago? Lastly, Original-
137
Or at least a branch of originalists. See Colby & Smith, supra note 134, at 244,
247–62.
138
See Amar & Lettow, supra note 23, at 900.
139
See Strauss, supra note 134, at 7–31.
140
See Levy, supra note 9, at 423; see also Eben Moglin, The Privilege in British
North America: The Colonial Period to the Fifth Amendment, in The Privilege against
Self-Incrimination 109, 138 (Helmholz et al. eds., 1997).
Unfortunately, the Framers did not engage in any oor debate when drafting or
adopting the Self-Incrimination Clause. Neither did the Clause's drafter, James
Madison, leave any thoughts or discourses on the matter.
141
Michael J. Gerhardt, Book Review: Interpreting Bork: The Tempting of America:
The Political Seduction of the Law, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 1358, 1382–83 (1990) (arguing
that the framers and ratiers rejected an interpretive theory of original understanding).
142
Strauss, supra note 134, at 24, 99–100 (quoting Thomas Jeerson Papers
15:392–97, Letter to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789)).
143
See Strauss, supra note 134, at 100.
144
The Framers set up the Republic to suppress any inkling of tyranny they
perceived to be present in the British monarchy. How ironic then that originalists, in a
way, argue that the Framers should have a somewhat tyrannical rule as an infallible
governing body which enjoys a dynasty of ideas some 200 years after their death.
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ism cannot explain the evolution of laws to allow for practices such as
desegregation or women's surage.145
Living Constitutionalism answers the aws of Originalism by holding
to the idea that the Framers created doctrines with many vagaries in
order to give the document room to be tailored to the times.146 Living
Constitutionalism does not constrict itself to the mores of the Framers,
but takes into consideration how the laws should apply and change to
suit the mores of the present day.147
One of the main criticisms of Living Constitutionalism is that it lacks
certainty, as the laws can change with the whim of activist judges
pushing their own social agendas.148 When legal interpretation is
captured by such activism, there may be no way to accurately predict
litigation outcomes ex ante. Thus, the population cannot intuitively
conform their actions to what they know the law to be.
However, judges are not able to “go rogue” as critics may suppose
since their actions are constrained by stare decisis.149 This common
law doctrine compels judges to follow prior decisions and the reason-
ing of previous courts.150 The central idea behind stare decisis is that
change should come through small incremental progressions allowed
and guided by the principles of the common law.151 Thus, only rarely
will judges introduce great uncertainty into the legal system by striking
down precedent and advocating a 180 degree turn. More commonly,
changes in the law are achieved by taking small bites over genera-
tions of cases. After all, climbing a ight of stairs is not done in one
145
See Strauss, supra note 134, at 77–97. Even Supreme Court Justice Antonin
Scalia, perhaps the most prominent defender of originalism today, stated in a 1997
speech that in regards to explaining the historical changes in constitutional law, such
as Brown v. Board of Education, stated “I am an originalist. I am a textualist. I am not
a nut.” Being an originalist when it is convenient is necessary to hold to the theory. In
contrast, adhering to complete consistency of originalism would mean arguing for the
framers' understanding and perpetuation of racial segregation and discrimination of
women, to name a few things. Strauss, supra note 134, at 12–17; see also Gerhardt,
supra note 141, at 1381 (stating that it may be necessary to abandon original intent
to deal with problems unforeseen by the framers).
146
See Balkin, supra note 134, at 553–54 (citing Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning
and Constitutional Redemption, 24 Const. Comment. 427, 457–61 (2007)); see also
Balkin, supra note 137, at 560–61; Strauss, supra note 134, at 113–14.
147
See Strauss, supra note 134, at 1–2.
148
See Strauss, supra note 134, at 36.
149
See generally Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 47
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 281 (1990) (discussing the current role of stare decisis in
Supreme Court jurisprudence).
150
See Strauss, supra note 134, at 33–35; see also Arthur W. Machen, Jr., The
Elasticity of the Constitution, 14 Harv. L. Rev. 200, 201–02 (1990).
151
See Strauss, supra note 134, at 41 (discussing Edmond Burke, the famous
18th century British judge who advocated for small, conservative change through the
common law).
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leap, but by taking one at a time and traversing a distance that only
seems great when you look back with hindsight. Thus, tailoring the
laws appropriately to the times is a strength of our Constitution152 and
a role the common law has played for centuries.153
When Living Constitutionalism is applied to the Right itself, the
questions become what lessons can be learned from history to see
where the Right has come from154 and what should be done to ensure
the Right's continued development along the same path? Courts have
answered the former question by referring to the tyrannical and
inquisitorial nature of religious courts in England and Europe, neces-
sitating the need for such a Right to protect the liberties of the
people.155 In contrast, courts have answered the latter question with
rulings like Miranda so as to minimize the possibility that the criminally
accused will have to answer a line of questioning that will result in
either self-accusation, perjury, or contempt.156
While both Originalism and Living Constitutionalism compete as
interpretational tools of the most important document in our Union,
only Living Constitutionalism consistently explains the changes of the
law in the hands of history. With this in mind, this Article points to a
152
Miranda itself has been described as a necessary tailoring of a prophylactic
law protecting the Right in order to combat the egregious fact patterns of eliciting
involuntary confessions in the 1950's and 60's. See Marcus, supra note 28, at 244.
Miranda has also been described as a reaction to restore the loss of civil rights
due to the Red Scare of the same time period in the 1950's. See Friendly, infra note
154, at 671 (citing Erwin N. Griswold, The Fifth Amendment Today (1955)).
153
See Strauss, supra note 134, at 51–98 (discussing examples of constitutional
change through the gradual evolution of the common law, including First Amendment
Jurisprudence, and landmark decisions like Brown v. Board of Ed. of Topeka, Shawnee
County, Kan., 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686, 98 L. Ed. 873, 38 A.L.R.2d 1180 (1954),
supplemented, 349 U.S. 294, 75 S. Ct. 753, 99 L. Ed. 1083, 71 Ohio L. Abs. 584
(1955), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973)
(holding modied by, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1992)).
154
See Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for
Constitutional Change, 37 U. Cin. L. Rev. 671, 678–79 (1968), stating
The privilege has always been responsive to the particular needs and problems of the time.
While no one could sustain the thesis that in 1789 the privilege was limited to political and
religious crimes, neither can anyone demonstrate that it would ever have come into existence
if its proponents had been murderers and rapists rather than John Lilburne in London and
William Bradford in Philadelphia. Just as it is “revolting to have no better reason for a rule of
law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV,” it would be ludicrous to attempt to
x the proper scope of the privilege in light of what was appropriate under the Stuarts or
Cromwell.
In other words, the Right probably would have been stomped out by public
opinion if it had arisen to protect vile oenders, as opposed to educated men of
conscious.
155
See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
156
See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 596, 110 S. Ct. 2638, 110 L. Ed. 2d
528 (1990).
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further method of historical analysis to add needed clarity to the ap-
plication of the Right in the context of this debate.
IV. Discussion: The Change of the Past Shapes the Change of
the Present
As stated previously, unlocking the answers to the perplexing ques-
tions concerning the Right's potency and scope are often sought in
the roots of its past.157 Considering the importance U.S. courts have
emphasized in looking backward in order to move forward, it is only
appropriate to outline and discuss the Right's development in common
law England in the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries as well as in the
American colonies before the Right was codied in the Constitution.158
This is the history that the Framers remembered, but we have
forgotten.159
The annals of history are not being opened160 for the purpose of
making originalist arguments, as is the common approach when
157
See Helmholz, Introduction, supra note 4, at 5; see also supra note 159 and
accompanying text.
158
It should also be noted that the right against self-incrimination goes back
further than the time period indicated. The Miranda court stated that “[t]hirteenth
century commentators found an analogue to the privilege grounded in the Bible,” and
also had roots in Jewish criminal procedure. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 459 n.27 (citing
Maimonides, Mishneh Torah (Code of Jewish Law), Book of Judges, Laws of the
Sanhedrin, c. 18, 6, III Yale Judaica Series 52–53); see also Norman Lamm, The Fifth
Amendment and Its Equivalent in the Halakhan, 5 Judaism 53 (1956). Levy conrms
this assertion, tracing the Right's roots at least as far back as the Jewish Talmud,
which records traditions going back to Biblical times. See Levy, supra note 9, at 433,
436–37. While this history is certainly relevant, it cannot be said to have been relied
upon by the Framers, whose ideas of civil and criminal procedure were the product of
16th, 17th, and 18th century English common law. While it is possible and potentially
plausible that the right against self-incrimination had roots in Judeo-Christian
theocratic criminal procedure, reliance on the Talmud is not authoritative for this piece.
159
See Quinn v. U.S., 349 U.S. 155, 161–62, 75 S. Ct. 668, 99 L. Ed. 964, 51
A.L.R.2d 1157 (1955), stating:
The privilege against self-incrimination is a right that was hard-earned by our forefathers.
The reasons for its inclusion in the Constitution — and the necessities for its preservation
— are to be found in the lessons of history. (citing Griswold, supra note 152, at 2–7). As
early as 1650, remembrance of the horror of Star Chamber proceedings a decade before
had rmly established the privilege in the common law of England. Transplanted to this
country as part of our legal heritage, it soon made its way into various state constitutions,
and ultimately, in 1791, into the federal Bill of Rights. The privilege, this Court has stated,
“was generally regarded then, as now, as a privilege of great value, a protection to the in-
nocent though a shelter to the guilty, and a safeguard against heedless, unfounded, or
tyrannical prosecutions.
This respect for history is repeated elsewhere in American common law when
referring to the Right, such as in this Article's opening quote from Maffie, 209 F.2d at
237.
160
This article is not meant to be a work of expansive legal history. Instead, I refer
readers to the works I largely relied upon in my research to gain a fuller view of the
Right's development in the hands of the common law. See generally Levy, supra note
9; see also Laurence A. Benner, Requiem for Miranda: The Rehnquist Court's Volun-
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considering the past in legal scholarship.161 Rather, the lesson to be
learned is the evolution of the Right as nurtured by the common law;
for this purpose, it is the journey that is important, and not the end
destination. Therefore, if the Right changed according to the current of
the common law in its 200 year history before the Constitutional
Convention, the pool of Framers—made up of mostly lawyers—would
have taken this legal history into account and expected the Right to
change in the next 200 years after its adoption in the Constitution.162
tariness Doctrine in Historical Perspective, 67 Wash. U.L.Q. 59, 67–92 (1989); Lawrence
Herman, The Unexplored Relationship Between the Privilege Against Compulsory
Self-Incrimination and the Involuntary Confession Rule (pts. 1 & 2), 53 Ohio St. L.J.
101 (1992), 53 Ohio St. L.J. 497 (1992); Steven Penny, Theories of Confession
Admissibility: A Historical View, 25 Am. J. Crim. L. 309, 314–22 (1988).
161
Some have dived into nding original intent to support the idea that over time,
the original intent of the Framers has been lost by constricting the Right more so than
it was ever intend. See Levy, supra note 9, at 427 (arguing that The Fifth Amendment
was meant to be bundle of pretrial rights that extended beyond the criminally accused
and his trial, whereas the Sixth Amendment was meant to be a bundle of rights at
trial); see also Thomas Y. Davies, Farther and Farther from the Original Fifth Amend-
ment: The Recharacterization of the Right Against Self-Incrimination as a “Trial Right”
in Chavez v. Martinez, 70 Tenn. L. Rev. 987, 1009–14 (2003); Albert W. Alschuler, A
Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective, in The Privilege against Self-Incrimination
181, 190–91 (Helmholz et al. eds., 1997) (stating “[t]he [Self-Incrimination Clause] that
the framers included in the Bill of Rights in 1791 . . . plainly refers, not just to the
initiation of criminal proceedings or to a rst accusation, but to the conduct of a
criminal trial”); John H. Langbein, The Privilege and Common Law Criminal Procedure:
The Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries, in The Privilege against Self-Incrimination
82, 82–83 (Helmholz et al. eds., 1997) (stating “[o]nly later did the practical usage of
the Self-Incrimination Clause change to being a ‘trial right.’ In the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, the development of the rules of evidence, and the emerging
importance of the criminal defense attorney, gave rise to this understanding.”).
162
The Framers were well aware of the common law's ability to shape precedent.
While detractors may argue that the Framers never intended Article III courts to wield
such power, William Michael Treanor's work sheds light on judicial review before
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 2 L. Ed. 60, 1803 WL 893 (1803), which has been
referred to as the genesis of judicial review by modern scholarship. See William
Michael Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 455, 457 (2005).
Treanor found thirty-one cases during the founding era in state and federal court
where judges invalidated laws for being unconstitutional, and seven more where the
law was upheld, but at least one judge would have invalidated the law on constitutional
grounds. Treanor, supra note 162, at 457–58. This in-depth study shows, even to the
originalist, that understandings of the constitutional powers of the courts during the
founding era, even before Marbury v. Madison, allowed for judicial review, and thus
gave the court their most drastic tool in shaping constitutional interpretations: invalidat-
ing legislative statutes. The Framers were aware of this, and so it should come as no
surprise that such avenues of change were entrusted to the courts. This also makes
sense from a political science perspective, since the Framers could be said to have
been rebelling against the Parliamentary Supremacy that dened English law.
As they moved toward revolution, Americans saw in British assertions of parliamentary
supremacy “the ascendancy of what [the old] constitutionalism had taught . . . Americans
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This section highlights the numerous ways that the Right evolved in
the common law from its rst assertions in 16th century England until
the time of the Framers.
A. From God's Law to Man's Law
The most basic change in the Right was the context in which it was
asserted. From its origins in England, the Right was rst invoked by
the accused to protect themselves from charges of religious crimes in
ecclesiastical courts. These courts were separate and apart from the
common law courts.163 In this context, the Right served as a defense
against the oppressive imposition of the oath ex officio,164 which
required a person to swear to tell the truth to any question asked of
him before he even knew the charges against him.165 To refuse to take
the oath or to refuse to answer a certain line of questioning would end
in the same result as if you had given a guilty confession.166 Beginning
in the 1500s, Protestants began suering unfortunate fates because
the oath ex officio not only oended their belief that they should not
swear, but also guaranteed their punishment for believing heretical
doctrine in the eyes of the Anglican Church.167
The procedure of administering the oath was terrifyingly brilliant, as
it was self-accusatory in nature. It was an “inescapable trap” since
refusal to take the oath would result in a ruling of guilt, but taking the
oath opened the accused to the almost certain punishment for perjury
(as conveniently determined by the ecclesiastical court), in which the
accused's lies were sucient evidence of their guilt.168 The oath ex of-
ficio opened the door to the historical trilemma of facing self-
accusation, perjury, or contempt, which came to dene the religious
to fear most-arbitrary power-and the demise of what that constitutionalism had taught them
most to cherish-liberty founded on restraints to power and protected by the rule of law.”
. . .
Parliamentary disregard of the sphere of colonial power was unacceptable and illegitimate
because, if Parliamentary power was not subject to limitation by competing power, it would
threaten freedom.
Treanor, supra note 162, at 539, 558.
Taking this into account, arguments that the Framers never intended for the
Courts to be able to shape Constitutional law fall at.
163
See Helmholz, Introduction, supra note 4, at 7.
164
More commonly known as the oath de veritate dicenda as it was termed in
canonical parlance. See Helmholz, Privilege, supra note 4, at 18.
165
See Levy, supra note 9, at 47.
166
See Levy, supra note 9, at 23–24, 132; see also 5 John H. Wigmore, A Treatise
on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law 274 (3d ed.
1940).
167
See Levy, supra note 9, at 159–60; see also Helmholz, Privilege, supra note 4,
at 18, 40–41.
168
See Levy, supra note 9, at 23–24.
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Inquisition sweeping across Europe during the Reformation and the
ecclesiastical courts' equivalent reign of terror in England.169
As time went on, bold, religious men of conscience transitioned from
merely not taking the oath to presumptively claiming they had a right
not to take the oath so as not to accuse themselves. After time, the
accused began winning this uphill battle, and the ecclesiastical courts
recognized the Right in 1641.170 However, this in no way aected the
criminal procedure in common law courts.171 While the common law
courts did not employ any oensive self-accusatory oaths, it was still
common practice to press the accused for guilty confessions in pretrial
examinations.172
It did not take the common law courts long to catch up when the
Right was established ocially in 1649.173 The hard-fought defense of
John Lilburne's trial for treason was the catalyst for this change.174 As
the inuence and jurisdiction of the religious courts faded as they
were eventually disbanded,175 the Right continued to apply in the com-
mon law courts. Thus, the Right which was intended to combat the
oath ex officio in religious tribunals was successfully transplanted into
the common law courts. It has been a source of protection for the
169
See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 110 S. Ct. 2638, 110 L. Ed. 2d 528
(1990). In Muniz, the Supreme Court discussed the policies supporting the privilege
against self-incrimination in deciding whether an answer to a question that was asked
of an individual during a custodial interrogation constituted testimonial evidence.
Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2641. The Court stated
[A]t its core, the privilege reects our erce unwillingness to subject those suspected of a
crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury, or contempt . . . that dened the
operation of the Star Chamber, wherein suspects were forced to choose between revealing
incriminating private thoughts and forsaking their oath by committing perjury.
. . .
Because the privilege was designed primarily to prevent “a recurrence of the Inquisition and
the Star Chamber, even if not in their stark brutality,” (citation omitted), it is evident that a
suspect is “compelled . . . to be a witness against himself” at least whenever he must face
the modern-day analog of the historic trilemma — either during a criminal trial where a
sworn witness faces the identical three choices, or during custodial interrogation where, as
we explained in Miranda, the choices are analogous and hence raise similar concerns.
170
Levy, supra note 9, at 282 (citing the Act for Abolition of the Court of High
Commission, and Act for Abolition of the Court of Star Chamber, both passed on July
5, 1641); see also Langbein, supra note 161, at 102.
171
John Udall was likely the rst to claim the Right against Self-Incrimination in a
common law trial in 1590 for his authorship of a book that was claimed to be libelous
to the queen and seditionist. See Levy, supra note 9, at 168.
See Levy, supra note 9, at 282.
172
Levy, supra note 9, at 282.
173
Levy, supra note 9, at 313.
174
See Friendly, supra note 154, at 678 (citing Levy, supra note 9, at 301–13).
175
See infra note 170 for the abolition of the ecclesiastical courts.
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criminally accused ever since.176 In other words, as the times changed,
so did the application of the Right.
This transplant was not the original intention of the religious men
who rst claimed the Right, nor the ecclesiastical courts that rst
recognized the Right. Rather, what started as a rebellion against the
oath ex officio as an attempt to avoid oending both God and man
became a staple in the secular courts for all to enjoy.
B. Self-Incrimination Extends to Self-Infamation
Another marked change in the evolution of the Right is its expansion
and subsequent constriction regarding the right against self-infamation,
or the right of a witness not to answer a question because it may
cause them embarrassment or infamy.177 In the1679 case of Nathaniel
Reading, the right against self-infamation was extended to witnesses
testifying against the defendant on the basis of avoiding public infame
or disgrace, even if they could not be later convicted for their testimony
because of an existing pardon.178 English criminal defendants enjoyed
this right against self-infamation as a broad extension of the Right.
The right against self-infamation was also enjoyed in certain colonies
both before and after the Revolution. States like New York, New
Jersey,179 Virginia,180 and Pennsylvania, which adopted the English's
interpretation of the Right, each respected a witness's right to avoid a
line of questioning on the grounds of self-infamation.181 However, this
right quickly fell out of favor in the states that did recognize the right
176
See Helmholz, Introduction, supra note 4, at 7, 18–19; Charles M. Gray, Self-
Incrimination in Interjurisdictional Law: The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, in
Self-Incrimination 47, 47–81, supra note 4 (describing the inter-jurisdictional relation-
ship between common law courts, which had the power to review and control the
ecclesiastical courts).
177
See Levy, supra note 9, at 317–18.
178
Levy, supra note 9, at 324. At the trial, a witness who had been pardoned from
all of this crimes and could not be convicted criminally of anything he confessed, still
was allowed not to answer the question of whether he had planned to set a city on
re. Levy, supra note 9, at 324. The judge decreed that “neither [the witness's] life
nor name must suer, and therefore such questions must not be asked him.” Levy,
supra note 9, at 324. The right against self-infamy had been advocated for along with
the right against self-incrimination since at least 1528 and had nally come to fruition
over 150 years later. Levy, supra note 9, at 319–20.
179
Levy, supra note 9, at 410–11.
180
Levy, supra note 9, at 406.
181
Levy, supra note 9, at 428–29. A Pennsylvania court decided that “[i]f
[questioning] would involve [the witness] in shame or reproach, [the witness] is under
no obligation to answer them.” Levy, supra note 9, at 429. Also, this was extended by
the same court in a civil case, stating that a witness could not be compelled to take
the witness's oath if the witness's testimony “tends to accuse himself of an immoral
act.” Levy, supra note 9, at 428–29.
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against self-infamation in the years following the Revolution.182 Further,
there is no proof that the right against self-infamation was ever
enjoyed in federal courts after the Constitution was ratied,183 which
the newly enacted Right would have applied to exclusively.184
Cutting the right of self-infamation out of the application of the Right
is a noticeable change between how the common law applied the
Right in England, and how the Right was interpreted in the Founding
generation.185 Such a change is another example of the common law's
evolution that the Framers would have been cognizant.
C. Pre-Trial Application, or Purely a Trial Right
The Right also changed in its application in pretrial criminal proceed-
ings before its adoption in the Constitution.186 In the beginning stages
of the common law, the Right applied to all proceedings, except pretrial
examinations.187 Justices of the Peace examined the accused for the
purpose of eliciting a confession. During such examinations, the Right
did not apply because the examinations were not considered judicial
proceedings.188 While there were other protections aorded the ac-
cused in these pretrial examinations,189 the Right was not one of them.
While England restricted the Right's application in pretrial interroga-
182
Levy, supra note 9, at 428–429.
183
Levy, supra note 9, at 427.
184
This was a time before the era of incorporation and before the Right was made
applicable to the states in Malloy, 378 U.S. at 8.
185
One can imagine the practical reasons for narrowing the Right to cut out self-
infamy or embarrassment, since such a right could be taken advantage of. Also, the
bounds of what could infame or embarrass are far more expansive than that which
would incriminate. However, it is no mystery that as reputation and social standing
became less of a commodity that this right fell out of use. This is especially true since
this right was transported from a land that fostered nobility to the colonies, which did
not have a noble class. Damaging the accused's reputation in 18th century America
simply did not have the same devastating eects on that person's social and economic
outlook that it did a century earlier in England. After all, it was part of American ideals
at the time to reject a social system with a ruling noble class, and to undue
primogeniture. Such a change in the application of the Right makes sense. The Right
was appropriately tailored for the time and place while keeping the proper balance
between the rights of the State with those of the accused.
186
As stated before in this section, outlining the history and changes of the Right
is not done for the purposes of making originalist arguments, but rather the opposite.
The discussion of changes in the application of the Right from being a trial right or
pre-trial right is only used to argue that changes occurred, not to argue that pre-trial
application was part of the Framer's original intent.
187
Levy, supra note 9, at 325.
188
Such examinations were not considered judicial proceedings in England until
1848. See Levy, supra note 9, at 329.
189
It was an established maxim in England that confessions must be voluntary,
and thus voluntariness and the Right came together in somewhat of a nexus to
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tions,190 several colonies recognized and applied the Right in this
context.191 In Virginia, for example, the Right was extended to apply to
pretrial examinations by Justices of the Peace from at least 1776
when the Revolution began.192 Since Virginia was considered to be the
largest and most wealthy of the colonies, it should come as no surprise
that many others emulated Virginia's version of their self-incrimination
clause. Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Vermont adopted the same
phraseology as Virginia's state self-incrimination clause;193 additionally,
Delaware, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire adopted virtually identi-
cal phraseology with only inconsequential changes.194
In developing the Right, this is one of the few examples of the
colonies being more progressive than England during the same time
period. Whereas England did not respect the Right at pretrial examina-
tions, several of the colonies did. This change in application shows
further evolution of the Right, which the Framers would have taken
into account adopting the Right into the Constitution.
D. Civil or Criminal Procedure
One of the most robust changes in the development of the Right
was its expansion to civil proceedings. In the common law courts of
England, the Right was only invoked by criminal defendants who
refused to take oaths or give self-incriminating answers. However,
some of the American colonies applied the Right to civil matters. For
instance, the language of Virginia's version of the Right appears to
have been applicable to witnesses giving testimony that damaged
them in civil matters as well as criminal matters. Virginia's version of
the Right should sound a bit familiar, reading as follows:
That in all capital or criminal prosecutions a man hath a right to demand
the cause and nature of his accusation, to be confronted with the accus-
ers and witnesses, to call for evidence in his favor, and to a speedy trial
by an impartial jury of twelve men of his vicinage, without whose
unanimous consent he cannot be found guilty; nor can he be compelled
protect the accused from eliciting dooming confessions. See Levy, supra note 9, at
327–29.
190
England did not extend the Right to pre-trial procedures until 1848, when the
Sir Jervis's Act required authorities to apprise the accused of their right not to answer
their questions. See Levy, supra note 9, at 375. Since this was long after the framing,
it is irrelevant to discuss for the purposes of what the Framers considered at the time
of the Constitutional Convention.
191
See Levy, supra note 9, at 406.
192
Levy, supra note 9, at 407.
193
See Levy, supra note 9, at 409–10.
194
Levy, supra note 9, at 409–10.
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to give evidence against himself; that no man be deprived of his liberty,
except by the law of the land or the judgment of his peers.195
While the immediate context of the Right in Virginia's Constitution
applies to capital or criminal cases, the Right would be rendered
superuous if it only applied in these situations because the accused
could not even take the stand in their defense at this time in the
colonies.196 What would be the purpose of having the Right if the
defendant could not even enjoy it at trial?
According to the vague text of the Virginia Constitution, the Right
would apply to civil trials, where the civil parties would not be required
to answer injurious questions that hurt their civil claims or defenses.
This textual interpretation would also apply to Pennsylvania, North
Carolina, and Vermont, which adopted the same phraseology as
Virginia's Self-Incrimination Clause,197 and additionally Delaware, Mas-
sachusetts, and New Hampshire, which included only minor changes
to the Virginia phraseology.198
The assertion that the Right extended to civil testimony regarding
civil rights may seem like a stretch, but is strengthened by the actual
drafting of the Fifth Amendment. James Madison, the drafter of the
Fifth Amendment, drafted the following:
No person shall be subject, except in cases of impeachment, to more
than one punishment or trial for the same oence; nor shall be compelled
to be a witness against himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor be obliged to relinquish his
property, where it may be necessary for public use, without a just
compensation.199
The textual expansion200 of the right to civil interests may have been a
result of poor draftsmanship, but is unlikely in light of Madison's educa-
tion and skill.201 When comparing the draft to the Fifth Amendment as
ratied, the relevant change is telling:
195
Levy, supra note 9, at 406; see also Moglin, supra note 140, at 134 (citing The
Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws 3813
(Francis N. Thorpe, 1909)).
196
See Levy, supra note 9, at 407, 375.
197
See Levy, supra note 9, at 409–10; Moglin, supra note 140, at 135.
198
See Levy, supra note 9, at 409–10; Moglin, supra note 140, at 135.
199
See Levy, supra note 9, at 422 (emphasis added).
200
Even textualists would have to agree with this argument. Textualism is the
theory of interpretation that states that an authority's text is the only source that
should be examined when trying to determine its meaning. Therefore, other interpre-
tive tools such as legislative history or historical sources of the time are not consider.
See generally Antonin Scalia, Textualism and the Constitution, in Debating Democracy:
A Reader in American Politics (Bruce Miro et al. eds., 7th ed. 2011).
201
Admittedly, it is a bit hypocritical of me given the scope of this Article, and
presumptuous to divine Madison's intent (as the originalist attempts to do).
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No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject
for the same oense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.202
The slight change of adding the phrase “criminal case”203 speaks
volumes. John Laurence, a Federalist lawyer from New York,204
proposed changes to the wording of the Fifth Amendment that was
unopposed and adopted unanimously, which conned the Right to that
of criminal cases.205 “Taken literally, the amended clause, ‘No person
shall . . . be compelled in any criminal case, to be a witness against
himself,’ excluded from its protection parties and witnesses in civil and
equity suits as well as witnesses before non-judicial governmental
proceedings such as legislative investigations.”206 This change shows
that the committee, or perhaps only Laurence, realized that clarica-
tion was necessary if the Right was to only apply to criminal cases.207
This necessary change in the language of the Fifth Amendment is
further evidence then that the Virginia Constitution, which lacked the
“criminal case” constriction, would have been understood to apply to
civil cases as well as to criminal cases.
The Fifth Amendment and Virginia's provision also share similarities
in their beginning phrases. Both clarify the context that they applied to
criminal cases at the beginning of their respective sections.208 However,
the Drafters of the Fifth Amendment found it necessary to re-establish
the context in regards to the Right by adding “in any criminal case”
into the language. Again, the fact that Laurence thought it necessary
202
U.S. Const. amend. V.
203
U.S. Const. amend. V. Also note that the language of the Fifth Amendment
establishes the context in its rst clause that the amendment applies to capital or
infamous crimes, similar to how Section 8 of the Virginia colonial Constitution
establishes its context in its rst line. See supra note 201 and accompanying text for
Section 8's text. However, the drafters of the Fifth Amendment found it necessary to
clarify the Self-Incrimination Clause by rearming the context of the criminal case,
which further supports the notion that the Section 8 clause, and those of the states
that adopted similar clauses, did apply (at least textually) to civil cases as well as
criminal cases.
204
Levy, supra note 9, at 424–25.
205
Levy, supra note 9, at 424–25; see also Moglin, supra note 140, at 138.
206
Levy, supra note 9, at 425.
207
Ironically, this clarication over 200 years ago has confounded the courts
today, resulting in the circuit split highlighted in this Article over the meaning of the
term “criminal case.”
208
See supra note 195 and accompanying text for the language of Virginia's Sec-
tion 8.
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to re-clarify the context in that particular clause suggested that in the
absence of this re-established context, it would be a reasonable
interpretation that the Right should apply beyond criminal cases.
This evidence from the draftsmanship of Virginia's Constitution and
the Fifth Amendment show yet another important change in the evolu-
tion of the Right. Whereas the Right was employed in the common law
courts in England in the exclusive context of criminal proceedings, it
appears from the text of Virginia's Constitution that this right was
expanded as early as 1776 to include civil matters as well. The Fram-
ers would have been well aware of this change, and of the textual
variations surrounding the Right, and thus acted to ensure an ironic
clarity209 in the Fifth Amendment.
E. The Accused's Right to Testify on Their Own Behalf
Perhaps the most shocking adaptation of the Right came with the
emergence of the defense counsel as a common participant in criminal
trials. In the 16th and 17th centuries, the application of the Right was
something quite dierent from today. During this time, the accused
were required to put on their own defense without the assistance of
defense counsel.210 “Without defense counsel, a criminal defendant's
right to remain silent was the right to forfeit any defense; indeed, in a
system that emphasized capital punishment, the right to remain silent
was tantamount to suicide.”211 This is evidenced by the fact that
between the 1670's and 1780's there are no recorded instances
when the accused refused to speak in their own defense.212
The plight of the accused in the pre-Constitutional era was
compounded by limitations on their ability to testify on their own behalf
and otherwise conduct a defense.213 The reasoning behind this restric-
tion was two-fold. First, a witness was qualied to testify based on his
or her competence, which was in turn partially determined by their
interest in the outcome of the case.214 No one would be more interested
in the outcome of the case than the criminally accused; in a sense, the
court could not trust this testimony because it would almost certainly
209
See supra note 207.
210
See Langbein, supra note 161, at 84.
211
See Langbein, supra note 161, at 107.
212
See Langbein, supra note 161, at 95–96. Further, the great political trials of the
17th century that gave birth to the common law's recognition of the Right followed
this criminal procedure. See, e.g., Levy, supra note 9, at 274–75, where accused like
John Lilburne in 1638 had to speak on their own behalf.
213
Levy, supra note 9, at 324. The accused in England were not allowed to testify
on their own behalf until 1898.
214
Levy, supra note 9, at 324.
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be biased, and thus was not allowed at all.215 Second, the courts could
be said to be paternalistic in trying to protect the accused from their
own testimony. If the accused took the stand to testify on their own
behalf, they would waive their Right and would open themselves up to
cross-examination questions with potentially dire eects.216
At rst blush, such criminal procedure could appear to be paternal-
istic, but in actuality was used to the accused's detriment. Ironically,
while the court restricted the sworn testimony from the accused to act
as a exculpatory witness on their own behalf, it compelled the ac-
cused to speak on their own behalf by encouraging them to put on
their own defense.217 Herein lies the technicality that harmonized this
denial of counsel with the Right. Since the Right only applied to sworn
testimony, defending oneself in open court without being sworn in
meant that the Right would not apply.218 Therefore, while the accused
still technically enjoyed the Right to refuse to answer lines of question-
ing that may incriminate themselves, they still had the burden of speak-
ing on their own behalf. What the courts realized all too well was a
criminal defendant, untrained in the art of law, could stumble over
himself, lose credibility with a jury, and incriminate himself through
inconsistencies when responding to the prosecutor's arguments or
examining witnesses. Such self-incrimination could happen just as
easily as if the defendant were answering questions directed at him
from the Crown or the court.219
Thus, without the active participation of defense counsel in criminal
cases, the Right was rendered somewhat powerless to protect
defendants from the perils of taking on their own defense.220 Not
surprisingly, these common law practices crossed over the pond;
most of the colonies adopted similar criminal procedures of denying
215
Levy, supra note 9, at 324.
216
Levy, supra note 9, at 324.
217
See Helmholz, Introduction, supra note 4; Langbein, supra note 161, at 9, 82–
84, 96. In medieval times and English common law, it was appropriate that the person
coming under suspicion of having committed a crime should speak for themselves.
See Helmholz, Introduction, supra note 4, at 13 (citing 2 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown,
ch. 39, § 2).
218
See Helmholz, Introduction, supra note 4, at 15.
219
The accused were encouraged even further to speak on his own behalf
because of the various other limitations on his ability to conduct his defense. In the
17th century, criminal defendants did not have the right to subpoena witnesses for
their defense. See Langbein, supra note 161, at 88.
220
See Helmholz, Introduction, supra note 4, at 9.
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defense counsel221 to the accused and having defendants put on their
own defense.222
The playing eld became slightly more level with the emergence of
the defense counsel in the late 18th century,223 which gave the Right
an entirely new meaning. It was only after the popularization of defense
by proxy224 that the Right actually became somewhat eectual for the
common man to exercise his right to not self-incriminate himself by
staying silent.225 Further ushering in the new age of criminal procedure,
defense counsels were more than willing to apply the old maxim of
nemo tenetur prodere seipsum226 in a way that had not been
contemplated in its original context. Namely, they began to argue suc-
cessfully that the accused has the right to not have to contribute to
their defense at all, whether that be giving testimony, or statements in
open court.
As the 18th century progressed, the utilization of defense counsel
became more popular, and was almost a default occurrence by the
time of the Convention. By the 1730s, defense counsel were just
starting to become more common in criminal cases.227 By the second
half of the 18th century, defense counsel began frequently silencing
their clients for reasons of obvious strategic advantages.228 By the
1780s, the use of defense counsel had exploded,229 with more and
more defendants enjoying the fruits of the Right in its new application.
By the time of the Constitutional Convention in the late 1780s, such a
radical change in the Right's application would have been all too ap-
parent to the Framers who would have seen this marked change in
the course of their own lives (and for many, their own law practices). It
is yet another example of a change in the Right's meaning that the
Framers would have been aware; as such, it is another justication
that they would have understood the Right to change and would have
expected the Right to continue changing in the future hands of the
common law.
221
See Moglin, supra note 140, at 112–13.
222
See Helmholtz, Introduction, supra note 4; Langbein, supra note 161, at 9, 83;
Moglin, supra note 140, at 111–14.
The colonies also limited the defendant's ability to subpoena witnesses, similar
to their English counterparts. See Moglin, supra note 140, at 112–13.
223
See Langbein, supra note 161, at 82–84.
224
The idea that someone could stand in your shoes and oer up a defense on
your behalf. Langbein, supra note 161, at 84.
225
Langbein, supra note 161, at 83–84.
226
See note 4 for further details on this term.
227
See Langbein, supra note 161, at 96–97.
228
See Langbein, supra note 161, at 99.
229
See Langbein, supra note 161, at 82–83, 96–97.
Criminal Law Bulletin
648 © 2015 Thomson Reuters E Criminal Law Bulletin E Vol. 51 No. 3
The above referenced changes in the scope, application, and
understanding of the Right show an evolution from the time it was ac-
cepted as a common law right through the time it was adopted into
the Constitution. Some changes were bigger than others. The size or
amount of change is not relevant, however, but only the presence of
change. This supports the foundational principle of interpreting the
Right: it was not a static right in common law England, and the Fram-
ers would have known that it would not be a static right in common
law America. Therefore, the only originalist conclusion that can be
supported from history is the intention of the Framers that the Right
change over time.
V. Conclusion
The Right has a long and distinguished history in Anglo-American
law.230 Courts have often turned to history to inform their interpretation
of the Right, and in doing so must make dicult decisions to continu-
ally adapt the Right to be eective in their time.231
The ndings of this Article uncovers a nugget of wisdom from his-
tory to be taken into consideration: the Right changed from the time
between its recognition as a common law right and its adoption in the
Constitution. Such change came as a result of the changing times, and
also through the transition of the Right from England to the American
colonies. Such changes prove that at the time of the framing, the Right
was known to have been a changing doctrine.
Such a nding bolsters the dominant view that the Constitution
should be understood as a living document and not subject to the
original meaning or intent of the Framers.
With this lesson in mind, courts should try and fashion the Right in a
way to eectively protect the accused in our criminal justice system.
This type of interpretation may shed light on solutions to the
highlighted circuit split. While the purpose of this Article was not to
resolve the split, I oer a few thoughts in closing.
First, the importance of pretrial procedures have increased
exponentially in determining outcomes in criminal cases.232 It would
behoove courts to consider this when crafting applications of the
230
See Helmholz, Introduction, supra note 4, at 15.
231
See, e.g., Miranda, 384 U.S at 458–60; Murphy, 378 U.S. at 58–77 (1964);
Tucker, 417 U.S. at 439.
232
See Jennifer Diana, Note, Apples and Oranges and Olives? Oh my!: Fellers,
The Sixth Amendment, and the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine, 71 Brook. L.
Rev. 985, 1001 (2005) (explaining that because of the signicant change of how
evidence is accumulated and presented at trial between the time of the framers to the
present day, pretrial proceedings now have the potential to “settle the accused's fate
. . . reducing the trial itself to a mere formality”) (quoting U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,
224, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (1967)); see also Beth Hornbuckle Fleming,
First Amendment Right of Access to Pretrial Proceedings In Criminal Cases, 32 Emory
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Right, which was meant to protect criminal defendants in an era when
trial was common. After considering that we live in a legal justice
system where the vast majority of cases are determined by pretrial
procedures, such as plea bargaining,233 interpreting the Right in a way
that accounts for pretrial protections is justied.
Second, post-trial sentencing procedures have been determined to
be of such signicance in eecting one's freedom that un-Mirandized
statements cannot be used.234 Therefore, it is interesting that the
courts would apply the Right and Miranda protections in sentencing
proceedings when there is little opportunity for a criminal to incriminate
themselves since they have already been convicted.235 If the expan-
sion of the Right and Miranda has reached sentencing hearings, then
should not it also reach pretrial proceedings, which are ironically much
more inuential in the depravation of liberty than sentencing?
Lastly, Chavez is best left interpreted by its own words. The Court
tellingly cited Black's Law Dictionary, which denes the word “case”
as “[a] general term for an action, cause, suit, or controversy at law
. . . a question contested before a court of Justice.”236 The Court also
quoted Blyew v. United States,237 which states that “[t]he words ‘case’
and ‘cause’ are constantly used as synonyms in statutes and judicial
L.J. 619, 633 n.42 (1983) (citing U.S. v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 363, 9 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 1409 (5th Cir. 1983); U.S. v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 555, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
1297 (3d Cir. 1982); State v. Williams, 93 N.J. 39, 53, 459 A.2d 641, 9 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 1585 (1983)) (supporting the nding that over the past two centuries, pretrial
proceedings have increased in importance in the criminal justice system to determin-
ing the guilt of the accused, since many of these actions are settled before reaching
trial); Langbein, supra note 161, at 82, 91 (citing Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining
and Its History, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1979)).
233
See Daniel L. Rotenberg, The Progress of Plea Bargaining: The ABA Standards
and Beyond, 8 Conn. L. Rev. 44, 44 n.3 (1975) (stating that “[w]ith a few exceptions,
judges and prosecutors from Arizona, Michigan, North Carolina, Wyoming, and Con-
necticut who were questioned for this study agreed on the necessity of plea bargain-
ing in order to keep the courts functioning”).
234
See Mitchell v. U.S., 526 U.S. 314, 327, 119 S. Ct. 1307, 143 L. Ed. 2d 424
(1999) (holding that a guilty plea waived a defendant's right to invoke the privilege
against self-incrimination at trial, but did not concomitantly waive the privilege at the
sentencing hearing); see also Higazy, 505 F.3d at 172 (where the Second Circuit
drew a parallel between sentencing proceedings and pretrial proceedings and cited
Mitchell to show that the Right should apply to pretrial procedures since it is ap-
plicable in sentencing hearings); Langbein, supra note 161, at 93–95 (comparing trials
in the 18th century with common day post-trial sentencing hearings).
235
An alternative situation which would render the Right relevant is if during a
sentencing hearing for one crime, the accused may need to invoke the Right to
prevent incriminating themselves in regards to another crime.
236
Chavez, 538 U.S. at 766 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 215, supra note 83).
237
Blyew v. U.S., 80 U.S. 581, 20 L. Ed. 638, 1871 WL 14736 (1871).
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decisions, each meaning a proceeding in court, a suit, or action.”238
While this may seem at odds with other language in the opinion,239 it
certainly points to clues that the Court intends a broader application
of the Right.
With the circuit split ever lingering, the future of the Right, Miranda,
and the criminally accused should take a lesson from history: change
is a good thing.
238
Chavez, 538 U.S. at 766 (quoting Blyew, 80 U.S. at 595 (emphasis added)).
239
See Chavez, 538 U.S. at 767 (citing U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259,
264, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 108 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1990) (“The privilege against self-
incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment is a fundamental trial right of criminal
defendants. Although conduct by law enforcement ocials prior to trial may ultimately
impair that right, a constitutional violation occurs only at trial.” (emphases added)
(citations omitted)); Withrow, 507 U.S. at 692 (describing the Fifth Amendment as a
‘‘ ‘trial right’ ’’)).
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